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1. Introduction 
In this paper I propose and defend the claim that English be going to (henceforth 
bgt) is composed of a progressive operator and a future modal wall (Abusch, 1985), 
as follows, with wall spelled out morphologically as go: 
( 1 )  Be going to 
TP 
----------
T PROGP 
� 
PROG 
be -ing woll P � 
wall 
go 
VP 
� 
The new idea here is that PROG does not take the bare VP as its argument, as we 
are used to seeing, but rather the larger wall P. I will call aspect in this kind of 
position "high aspect" - since it is higher than aspect is normally, when it combines 
semantically with the VP. This requires nothing new in the way of denotations as 
long as wall P has the same type as VP. 
We will have lots more to say about the meaning of the structure in ( 1 ) ,  
by way of arguing that bgt in  fact has that meaning. But intuitively for now, the 
partially-decomposed meaning of the part of the structure, with a present tense in 
T and using a very basic meaning for the progressive operator, would be something 
like that given in (2c) below. "NOW" is the time of utterance. 
(2) a. 
b. 
c. 
[PRES] (i) = 1 iff i = NOW 
[PROG] (p)(i) = 1 iff :3j : j includes i and p(j) 
[PRES PROG wall VP] (i) = 1 iff :3 j :  j includes i & [wall VP] (j) & 
j = NOW 
I will not try to deconstruct wall just yet; once we have defended the hypothesis 
that this is the right meaning, we will be counting on properties of bgt to tell us a 
little more about the meaning of wall. 
One thing that will allow us to test this hypothesis is that the proposed struc­
ture for bgt is very similar to the structure proposed for will and would by Abusch 
(1985) (where will is the present tense version, and would the past tense version) : 
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(3) Will/would 
TP 
� 
T woll P 
� 
woll VP 
� 
Bridget Copley 
Thus the only difference between willlwouid and bgt, under the hypothesis I would 
like to pursue, is that bgt has a PROG operator that will and would lack. 1 Therefore, 
we should be able to find parallels between ordinary progressive sentences and bgt 
sentences that are not shared by simple form sentences (those in which the verb 
carries nothing but agreement) and will sentences; and vice versa. 
First, I will argue that the differences between the bgt and willlwouid are 
those that would be expected to arise from the presence/absence of progressive 
aspect. Second, I argue that bgt and will/would share two properties that they would 
be expected to share if they share the same future modal . Thirdly, we will work 
through some of the formal details and implications of the proposal ,  and see that it 
points us toward a particular kind of denotation for woll. Next, I discuss how the 
analysis of bgt as a case of high aspect fares with some additional data, having to do 
with contexts in which the speaker is volunteering to do something. Finally we take 
a brief look at the syntactic evidence that bgt is monoclausal ,  with a view towards 
understanding whether high aspect can really be high in the clause, or if it is simply 
ordinary low aspect in a higher clause. 
2. The case for PROG in bgt 
In this section, we will discuss a number of differences between bgt and will. I 
will argue that the differences reflect an aspectual difference: namely, that bgt has 
a progressive operator between T and woll, and will does not. 2 One assumption 
we must make to get the ball rolling is that PROG has the same meaning no matter 
what it takes as its argument. The methodology of this section is then as follows: 
we will compare bgt sentences with will sentences, and if the comparison is parallel 
to a comparison with progressives and simple forms (V-ing and V), then we will be 
licensed to conclude that the difference is due to presence/absence of progressivity. 
The evidence is of necessity somewhat circumstantial, but the hope, as always, 
is to get a cluster of facts, all of which point in the same direction. Here I will 
point out three such facts : bgt patterns with progressives - and against willlwouid 
and simple forms of the verb - in availability of generic readings, availability of 
futurate readings, and ability to be predicated of the present. 
2. 1 .  Generics 
As has been noted (Diesing, 1992; Dowty, 1979), progressives do not easily allow 
generic readings. For instance, while the simple verb construction in (4a) has a 
BE GOING TO AS A CASE OF HIGH ASPECT 
generic reading, being a claim about the typical kid, (4b) generally has only an 
existential reading, and claims that some kids are currently eating candy: 
(4) a. Kids eat candy. 
b. Kids are eating candy. 
This is not to say that generic readings are always impossible with progressives; 
on the contrary, they are possible in the presence of a "related constituent" in the 
Carlson ( 1989) sense: 
(5) a. Kids are always eating candy. 
b. Kids are eating candy whenever I see them. 
c. Kids are eating candy on my lawn every day at sunset lately. 
d. Kids are eating candy more and more these days. 
One sketch of an explanation of these facts is that these elements, but not progres­
sives, are able to quantify over situations, in the sense of Kratzer ( 1989). Simple 
forms, on the other hand, are somehow able to have quantification over situations 
on their own. Whatever the analysis, however, the fact is that (4b) apparently does 
not get a generic reading on its own. 
Like progressives, and unlike simple verb forms, bgt does not generally have 
generic readings in the absence of a "related constituent" in the sentence. On the 
other hand, will, which our hypothesis assumes to be the non-progressive counter­
part of bgt, does license generic readings in those contexts. This is demonstrated 
in (6), which parallels (4) above: (6a) has a generic reading, about the tendency of 
kids to eat candy, but (6b) makes an existential claim. 
(6) Generic reading with will but not with bgt 
a. Kids will eat candy. 
b. Kids are going to eat candy. 
As with progressives, generic readings of bgt improve when there is something else 
in the sentence. The sentence in (7a), for example, may be used to make a prediction 
that it will always be the case that kids will be candy-eaters . 
(7) a. Kids are always going to eat candy. 
b. Kids are going to eat candy whenever I see them. 
c .  Kids are going to eat candy on my lawn every day at sunset for the 
next little while. 
d. Kids are going to eat candy more and more in the coming weeks. 
We have seen (without trying to explain why this should be so) that bgt and will 
pattern like progressives and simple forms with respect to the availability of generic 
readings. 
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2.2. Futurate readings 
In this section we examine another difference between bgt and will/would which is 
reminiscent of a difference between progressives and simple forms: the availability 
of futurate readings. First we will look at some background on futurate readings. 
Then we will detect a futurate reading in waslwere going to (wgt), but not in would, 
in two ways (we will use the past tense versions wgt and would exclusively, because 
these tests are unfortunately impossible to run in the present tense) . This constitutes 
evidence that there is a progressive in bgt. Finally we will discuss what these tests 
mean for the proposed analysis of bgt. 
2.2. 1 .  Background on futurates 
Futurate readings are those that involve a future-oriented event predicate which 
must be plannable, or otherwise pre-determined,3 as in the classic examples in 
(8) . The hallmark of a futurate is exactly this pattern: grammatical with plannable 
events, ungrammatical with unplannable events. Of course, (8b) improves consid­
erably if the victory can be viewed as plannable, for instance if the mafia has fixed 
the game. . 
(8) a. The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow. 
b. # The Red Sox are defeating the Yankees tomorrow. 
As has been observed by Lakoff ( 197 1 ), Vetter ( 1973), Copley (200 1) ,  and 
many others, futurate readings are available in the present tense not only with pro­
gressives as above, but also with simple forms: 
(9) a. The Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow. 
b. # The Red Sox defeat the Yankees tomorrow. 
Past tense futurates, however, are by and large available only with progressives: 
( 10) a. The Red Sox were playing the Yankees tomorrow. 
b. # The Red Sox were defeating the Yankees tomorrow. 
( 1 1 )  a. * The Red Sox played the Yankees tomorrow. 
b. * The Red Sox defeated the Yankees tomorrow. 
Briefly, then, both progressive and simple forms can have futurate readings 
in the present tense. However, under a past tense, only progressive constructions 
get futurate readings. We will shortly use this generalization in our test for whether 
the difference between wgt and would is one of progressivity. 
2.2.2. Could bgt have a futurate reading ? 
Like will, is going to can occur with unplannable events, as in ( 12b). As we saw 
just now, this contrasts with futurate readings of progressives, shown again in ( 1 3b) 
for comparison. 
BE GOING TO AS A CASE OF HIGH ASPECT 
( 12) Bgt/will 
a. Pedro is going to/will pitch tomorrow. 
b. Pedro is going to/will pitch a perfect game tomorrow. 
( 13) Futurate 
a. Pedro is pitching tomorrow. 
b. * Pedro is pitching a perfect game tomorrow. 
This tells us that bgt, unlike progressives, does not always show the characteristic 
judgments that diagnose futurate readings. However, from this we cannot conclude 
that it never does, and therefore has no PROG operator. The lack of a futurate pattern 
of judgments in present tense bgt is compatible with, and in fact expected on, the 
analysis we are pursuing, in which bgt is composed of PROG over the future modal 
woll. 
To show this, let 's consider [PROG VP] . The presence of PROG could either 
give us a futurate reading, or the ordinary ongoing reading:4 
( 14) a .  
b. 
The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow. 
The Red Sox are playing the Yankees right now. 
These two readings are given in ( 1 Sa) and ( lSb) . The analogous readings for 
[PROG woll VP] , our hypothesis for bgt, are given in ( 1Sc) and ( l Sd) (the latter 
is essentially what we saw in (2). I will not attempt to give an explanation of the 
futurate reading here or later, but see Landman ( 1992) or Dowty ( 1 979) for treat­
ments . 
( IS) a. 
b. 
:3 a plan at time i to the effect that :3j later than i :  [VP] G) 
:3j : j includes i and [VP] G) 
c. :3 a plan at time i to the effect that :3j later than i :  [woll VP](j) 
d. :3j : j includes i and [woll VP] (j) 
Where both ( l Sc) and ( lSd) are available, it  is predicted that the futurate pattern 
of judgments should not be found. Here's why. The reading in ( lSc) would not be 
expected to be acceptable with an unplannable eventuality, and so the futurate pat­
tern (acceptable with plannable eventualities, unacceptable with unplannable ones) 
would show up if it were the only reading. However, the reading in ( l Sd) would 
be expected to be acceptable with either a plannable eventuality or an unplannable 
eventuality. Therefore, even if a bgt sentence was ruled out for the reading in ( lSc) 
by virtue of having an unplannable eventuality, it would be ruled in on the reading 
in ( lSd), and we would not see a futurate pattern of judgments. 
This lack of the futurate pattern of judgments is what we see using the 
present tense version of bgt in ( 12) .  However, in the past tense we can apparently 
rule out the second reading, in two environments . 
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2.2.3 . Futurate readings with wgt: the first environment 
The first environment we will have to do a little setting up for. It is a fact about 
would, due originally to Stowell, that matrix would is ungrammatical when the 
event has not actually happened by the time of utterance. Indeed that is what ( 16a) 
entails, as we see from the fact that ( 16b) is something of a contradiction. 
( 16) a. This little boy would grow up to be king. 
b. * This little boy would grow up to be king, but he didn't . 
Other examples are in ( 17). 
( 17) a. * Pedro would pitch the following day, but then he caught a cold and 
didn't . 
b. * Pedro would pitch a perfect game the following day, but then he 
caught a cold and didn't . 
Let's call this the "matrix would observation" : 
( 1 8) Matrix would observation (MWO): 
would P -+ PAST P 
(Note that there is no corresponding matrix will observation such that will P -+ 
PRES P. So we will have to deal with past tense wgt if we are going to compare bgt 
with willlwould here.) 
Is there a corresponding observation for wgt? At first glance there appears 
not to be, because ( 19a), which is of the form wgt P & ,PAST P, is good. But on 
the other hand, ( 19b) is not good.5 
( 19) a. Pedro was going to pitch the following day, but then he caught a cold 
and didn't. 
b. * Pedro was going to pitch a perfect game the following day, but then 
he caught a cold and didn't . 
The difference between the event in ( 19a) and the event in ( 19b) is that the former 
is plannable, while the latter is not, which ought to make us think of futurates. 
The most plausible explanation for these facts, I believe, is that the MWO 
applies to wgt on the ( 15d) reading - i .e . ,  on the ( 15d) reading, wgt is bad when the 
eventuality doesn't end up happening - but not on the ( 15c) reading. And in support 
of this hypothesis, it does appear that in ( 19a) the only reading is one where there 
was, at some previous time, a plan that Pedro would pitch the following day. 
However, we need to say why the MWO does not rule out the ( 15c) read­
ing. The answer may have to do with the "M" (which stands for "matrix") in the 
MWO. The MWO does not hold in embedded contexts ,  as in (20), where wall VP 
is evaluated on John's belief worlds . 
(20) a. John believed that Mary would go. 
b. Mary went. 
BE GOING TO AS A CASE OF HIGH ASPECT 
If we were to go ahead and give a modal semantics for futurate readings (e.g. ,  
Landman ( 1992» , in the ( 1 5c) reading [woll VP] would be evaluated on, speaking 
casually, the planned worlds, not the actual world. In that case, the MWO would 
not be expected to hold for the ( 15c) reading. But in the ( 1 5d) reading, [woll VP] 
would be evaluated on the actual world, so it would still be expected to run afoul of 
the MWO. This would explain why the futurate pattern of judgments shows up in 
( 19).6 
To summarize: this first environment in which we get only a futurate reading 
of wgt phrases is one in which the event described by the predicate doesn't end up 
happening. This rules out the ( 1 5d) reading, by the MWO, and allows the futurate 
pattern of judgments in the ( 1 5c) reading to be detected. 
2.2.4. Futurate readings with wgt: the second environment 
A second environment that only allows futurate readings is one in which there is a 
clause-initial durative adverbial . Futurates can have a clause-initial durative adver­
bial that refers to the time of the plan, as in (2 1) .  Recall that the eventuality must 
be plannable in futurates : 
(2 1 )  a. For several days, Nomo was pitching against the Yankees 
(next Thursday). 
b. * For several days, Nomo was pitching a perfect game against the 
Yankees (next Thursday). 
For some reason this is not possible with present tense futurates, as in (22), so again 
we will be limiting ourselves to wgt and would. 
(22) * For several days, Nomo is pitching against the Yankees 
(next Thursday). 
It turns out that wgt, like past progressives, can appear with durative adver­
bials only when the eventuality is plannable: 
(23) a. For a long moment, Nomo was going to throw a fast ball. 
b. * For a long moment, Nomo was going to strike out the batter. 
The same sentences with would, on the other hand, which we have seen do not have 
futurate readings, also do not support these clause-initial durative adverbials :  
(24) * For a long moment, Nomo would throw a fast ball. 
Thus we see that in this environment too, we can rule out the non-futurate read­
ing of bgt and demonstrate the futurate pattern of judgments, in which plannable 
eventualities are good and unplannable eventualities are bad. 
I have argued for the analysis of bgt given in ( 1 )  by showing that wgt, but 
not would, has a futurate reading. This is predicted by the analysis because in past 
contexts, progressives, but not simple forms, have a futurate reading. Therefore the 
fact that wgt has a futurate reading but would does not is expected under an analysis 
where wgt has a progressive operator but would does not. 
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2.3 .  The present perfective constraint 
So far we have seen that bgt and progressives pattern together in their ability to have 
generic readings and futurate readings. A third similarity, I will argue, is in their 
ability to take a present time as their temporal argument. 
It is a well-known cross-linguistic fact that perfectives are not allowed to 
have present reference. The English version of this fact is in (25) . The progres­
sive can be used to report the current raining eventuality, but the simple form, also 
sometimes called the perfective, cannot: 
(25) a. Oh look, it's raining. 
b. * Oh look, it rains. 
One way to think about this is that the perfective says that a proposition holds at 
a time, and for some reason this time is never allowed to be NOW, the time of 
utterance. 
(26) a. [PF] (p )(i) = 1 iff p(i) & -,3 k# i: k includes i and p(k) 
Progressives, on the other hand, are a kind of imperfective, and they say that a 
proposition holds of an interval which includes the time it takes as an argument, so 
even when the time is NOW, there is no problem. 
Now consider will and bgt. Under the hypothesis we have been consider­
ing, will is the perfective member of the pair (assuming that perfectives are bare 
in English), and bgt is the imperfective member, by virtue of having a progressive 
operator. The question I would like to ask here is whether the present perfective 
constraint that is responsible for the ungrammaticality of (25b) is also responsible 
for the ungrammaticality of (27b ) (of course 'll is just the cliticized form of will) . 
(27) a. Oh look, it's going to rain. 
b. * Oh look, it' ll rain. 
The explanation would run as follows. Suppose [wall VP] takes a time and says of 
it that during that time the VP is predicted to happen at some later time. We will get 
to a more precise treatment of wall later, but this will do for now. Then [bgt VP] , 
being (by hypothesis) [PROG wall VP] , would say of a time that it is ongoing at that 
time that the VP is predicted to happen at some later time (on the ongoing reading 
( 15d); we need not consider the futurate reading ( 15c) here because raining is not 
plannable). When present tense is added to these, to create respectively will VP and 
is going to VP, then the time which is being talked about must be a present time. 
Whether this 'present time is the present instant or some longer time (as in generics, 
e.g.) is up in the air; the examples in (27) are intended to rule out a longer interval 
by including "oh look," so that the speaker is making the prediction suddenly. In 
that case, we would expect, given the perfective present constraint, to be able to use 
PROG wall VP as in (27a), but not bare wall VP as in (27b). 
That said, the data below seem to be left unexplained by that explanation, to 
the extent that they are better than (27b) : 
BE GOING TO AS A CASE OF HIGH ASPECT 
(28) a. It ' ll rain next week. 
b. It'll rain in two minutes . 
c .  Don't worry, it' ll rain. 
One way to get around this is to say that in those examples, the speaker is not 
making a prediction based on the present instant, but rather on a longer interval 
including the present instant. This makes a certain amount of sense in that a number 
of observations would be needed to be able to say (28a) with any certainty, and 
perhaps even (28b). As for (28c), to my ear at least it carries a certain flavor of 
"speaking from experience," so perhaps that is telling us that again, there is a longer 
interval involved than the present instant. This might be similar to generic readings 
of present perfectives, which are presumably allowed because they make a claim 
about longer interval than the present. In that case the explanation I have given 
above might be able to rule out (27b) without ruling out any of the examples in 
(28). However, some work is undoubtedly still needed to flesh out this line of 
thinking and determine any further predictions. 7 
I have argued that there are a number of parallels between simple forms and 
progressives on the one hand, and willlwould and bgt on the other. Progressives 
and bgt resist generic readings, have futurate readings, and can be predicated of the 
present instant. Simple forms and willlwould have none of these properties. This 
supports the hypothesis that bgt differs from willlwould in having a progressive 
operator. 
3. The case for woll in bgt 
Up to this point we have been looking at differences between bgt and willlwould. 
The major similarity between bgt and will/would, of course, is that they both involve 
future reference. But since it is possible to have future reference in the absence of 
future tense, it will be important to compare bgt and will on the one hand with 
other means of future reference on the other. What I have in mind are modals and 
futurate readings of progressives, arguably neither of which involves a future tense, 
but which can involve future reference. 
3 . 1 .  The Matrix Would Observation 
As we saw above, there is reason to believe that both would and one of the readings 
of wgt obey the MWO, the observation that in the matrix, would P entails that P 
has happened by the time of utterance. This similarity can plausibly be assumed 
to be because they share a similar means of referring to the future. For the sake of 
comparison, note that past modals and futurates do not obey the MWO, because a 
continuation asserting that the eventuality didn't happen does not result in a contra­
diction. 
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(29) a. Pedro was supposed to pitch against the Yankees, but in the end he 
didn't . 
b. (At that point) Pedro might have pitched against the Yankees, but in 
the end he didn't. 
c .  (At that point) Pedro was pitching against the Yankees, but in the end 
he didn't . 
So if both would and one of the readings of bgt obey the MWO, it is not just because 
they both involve future reference, but must be because they both refer to the future 
by the same, or at least similar, means. 
3 .2. Felicity under predict 
Both will and bgt share the property of being felicitous under verbs such as predict, 
as Presque (2000) points out. Sentences without these - even those that can have 
a futurate reading - are not felicitous. 
(30) a. Mary predicts that John will push the button. 
b. Mary predicts that John is going to push the button. 
c. * Mary predicts that John pushes the button. 
d. * Mary predicts that John is pushing the button. 
e. * Mary predicts that John pushed the button. 
f. * Mary predicts that John was pushing the button. 
To this list we add modals: 
(3 1 )  a. * Mary predicts that John may pushlbe pushing the button. 
b. * Mary predicts that John is supposed to pushlbe pushing the button. 
This is again evidence that will and bgt share the same, or at least similar, means 
of refering to the future. Though it may be mysterious why predict is able to dis­
tinguish between the future reference of will and bgt on the one hand and that of 
futurates and modals, it seems to be able to. Along with the facts about the MWO, 
this should allow us to go ahead with the hypothesis that the same element, which 
we are calling wall, figures in both will and bgt. 
4. Formal details 
We will begin with a number of assumptions : Types are times (i) and truth values 
(t) . The variables I will use for times are i, j ,  and k; and for predicates of times (type 
(i, t) , I will use the variable p. Present and past tense, as well as what are normally 
called "propositions", are predicates of times;8 aspects and wall are operators on 
times (type ( (i ,  t) , (i , t) ) ) .  Rules of composition are PM (predicate modification) 
and FA (functional application), as given in Heim and Kratzer ( 1998). We will 
pretend arguments are VP-intemal. Times are intervals on a dense linear timeline 
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(we will not be getting into intensional semantics or branching time, though we will 
see where such a move is the next step). Notions like "=" and "before" have their 
intuitive values, and NOW is the time of utterance. 
(32) Tense 
a. Present tense 
[PRES] (i) = 1 iff i = NOW 
b. Past tense 
[PAST] (i) = 1 iff i is before NOW 
(33) Progressive aspect 
[PROG] (p)(i) = 1 iff :3j : j includes i and p(j) 
Let's try the simplest denotation possible for wall first, where it is a predicate of 
times: 
(34) wall (version 1 of 3) 
[walll ] (p )(j) = 1 iff :3k: j is before k and p(k) 
In that case, bgt would tum out like this :  
(35) is gaing ta 1 
a. [PRES PROG wall VP] (i) 
= 1 iff i = NOW and [PRoGwalll VP] (i) 
b. . . .  = 1 iff i = NOW and :3j : j includes i and [walll VP](j) 
c .  . . .  = 1 iff i = NOW and :3j : j includes i and :3k: j is before k and 
[VP] (k) 
But compare this denotation with the denotation of a version of will that 
uses walll (call it will 1 ) .  
(36) [Willl VP] (i) = 1 iff i = NOW and :3k: i is before k and [VP] (k) 
Using these denotations, is gaing ta 1 and willl are truth-conditionally equivalent, 
which is an unwanted result given all the differences we have just outlined. For if 
an interval i precedes an interval k, there will always be an interval j that includes i 
and precedes k. And as long as the timeline is dense, it will also always be true that 
for any interval j that precedes k, there will always be an interval i included in j that 
also precedes k. 
The obvious answer to this problem is to introduce some sort of modality 
into the denotation of wall, such as the following (though for space reasons, we will 
not get into an explicit modal semantics here) . 
(37) wall2 (version 2 of 3) 
[wall2 ]  (p)(i) = 1 iff :3k: i is before k and it is predicted at i that p(k) 
This avoids the truth-conditional equivalence problem, because in a case where p(k) 
is predicted at an interval i ,  there will not always be an interval j including i such 
that p(k) is predicted throughout j .  And in fact, this is something like what I alluded 
to in the earlier discussion of the perfective present constraint. 
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Still, there is an undesirable consequence of adopting a denotation such as 
(37): it will not allow us to derive the MWO. Consider, for instance, a situation in 
which it was predicted at time t that a boy would become king upon reaching the 
age of 2 1 .  But suppose that at age 19  the boy decided to run away and join the 
circus instead. It would be false to say of time t that that boy would become king at 
the age of 2 1 .  Using wall2 yields the following denotation of wauld: 
(38) [PAST wall2 VP] (i) = 1 iff i is before NOW & 3k: i is before k and it is 
predicted at i that p(k) 
However, it is predicted to be a true utterance if we use this denotation, because it 
would be true that it had been predicted at t that the boy would ascend the throne at 
2 1 .  
S o  instead let us use a version of wall as follows :  
(39) wall (version 3 of 3) 
[wall] (p)(i) = 1 iff 3k: i is before k and it is inevitable at j that p(k) 
As far as it goes, this version will allow us to derive the MWO. It raises a number 
of other problems, though, such as whether it was inevitable at time t that the boy 
was going to run away and join the circus ; was there no other choice available to 
him from birth? If not, then the truth-conditional equivalence problem arises again. 
Furthermore, this denotation makes wall a kind of stative predicate, and that is not 
what we want, for two reasons. First, if the idea in section 2.3 is correct, we do not 
want [wall VP] to be stative (or else will it could take a present time as its argument 
without running afoul of the present perfective constraint) . Secondly, if [wall VP] 
is stative it is unclear why wall P would be the argument of a progressive operator, 
as proposed for bgt, since for the most part progressives do not take statives as argu­
ments (Dowty, 1979; Smith, 1991) .  However, we will have to leave these questions 
for a more detailed treatment of the modal semantics of wall. 
5. Volunteering contexts 
I have argued above that bgt is composed of PROG and wall, as in the tree in ( 1 ) .  
Now we will apply this idea to try to explain another fact about the distribution of 
bgt, in contexts of volunteering. 
It appears that bgt is not used in contexts of volunteering, though will is. For 
example, the speaker of (40a) is offering to change your oil. But (40b) cannot be 
used for the same purpose. 
(40) A sign seen (and one not seen) on the highway 
a. We'll change your oil in Madera. 
b. * We're going to change your oil in Madera. 
Why does (40b) sound so funny? In fact, it sounds a little bossy: "We're going to 
change your oil in Madera even if you weren't planning to get off the highway at 
Madera. You are now." 
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One possibility, of course, is that somehow will has "more modality" to it 
than does bgt, contrary to what we have been assuming. But it could also be that 
somehow the progressive operator in bgt gets in the way of having a volunteering 
reading that would otherwise be available with woll. I'd like to briefly consider both 
possibilities, and show that the progressive story does at least as well as the modal 
story in explaining this fact. 
First, though, we should note that the volunteering context is one in which 
the eventuality being volunteered by the speaker (in this case, the oil change) is not 
necessarily going to happen anyway. Let's call this "the volunteering condition." 
For an utterance to count as an act of volunteering, the volunteered eventuality must 
be contingent on the interlocutor's desires. Conditionals are useful for modeling 
contingencies, so let's suppose that acts of volunteering such as the one in (40a) 
are really conditionals with a covert antecedent meaning something like if you like. 
The conditional in (40b) is still a little strange: 
(41 )  a. If you like, we' ll change your oil in Madera. 
b. # If you like, we're going to change your oil in Madera. 
The modal account would go something like this. Suppose bgt is just the linear 
future operator wolll ' whereas will is modal and says that for all of the closest ac­
cessible worlds w, there exists a future time k such that p(k)(w). Then bgt can't 
be used in volunteering contexts because it can't be used to talk about contingen­
cies, but only things which are inevitable. This is fine, but we can also explain 
the unacceptability of bgt in volunteering contexts with the analysis we have been 
pursuing. 
Pragmatic conditionals, as in (42a), famously resist perfection of the condi­
tional, which is the tendency to infer from a conditional P ---t Q, -,p ---t -,Q. In (42a), 
for instance, perfection is not licensed by the conditional . However, the hearer of 
(42b) does tend to perfect it. The bgt case, in (42c), behaves like the non-perfecting 
(42a), not like the perfecting (42b). 
(42) a. If you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge. --I't 
If you're not thirsty, there is no beer in the fridge. 
b. If you're thirsty, we' ll go get some beer. ---t 
If you're not thirsty, we won't go get some beer. 
c .  If you're thirsty, we're going to go get some beer. --I't 
If you're not thirsty, we are not going to go get some beer. 
Perfection of the conditional in the case of (42b) satisfies the volunteering condi­
tion that the eventuality not be going to happen anyway. Non-perfection of the 
conditional in the case of (42b) runs afoul of the volunteering condition. 
So why doesn't (42b) have perfection of the conditional? The conditional 
in (42a) doesn't, presumably, because it really means something like (43a) (and in 
that form, it does perfect, as in (43b)) : 
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(43) a. If you're thirsty, then it's relevant to you that there's beer in the 
fridge. 
b. If you're not thirsty, then it's not relevant to you that there's beer in 
the fridge. 
What I would like to argue is that the bgt conditional in (42b) can only be interpreted 
as a pragmatic conditional like (42a) . Because of the presence of the progressive, 
the bgt consequent will get either a futurate future reading as in ( l 5c), or an ongoing 
future reading as in ( 15d). In either case these are facts about present existing 
conditions, because either the plan is said to hold at the present time, or [woll VP] 
holds at the present time. Something that holds in the present can be a relevant fact. 
However, I have argued (in section 2.3) that woll has trouble referring to the present 
time. While I don't have a story about how woll in conditionals works, it seems 
not to refer to existing conditions the way that bgt does, and therefore would not 
normally be able to appear in a relevance conditional . 
We have seen that the PROG + woll analysis can do as well as the modal al­
ternative analysis in explaining the lack of bgt in volunteering contexts . The modal 
analysis, however, has no obvious explanations for the facts in the previous sections, 
so the progressive analysis is to be preferred overall .  
6. Is bgt monoclausal? 
If we are correct in saying that bgt is made up of PROG and Fut, then it would 
be nice to know the position of this PROG operator in the clause, because usually 
PROGP occurs just dominating the VP, and here it is seems to be higher. Another, 
lower progressive can appear on the main verb: 
(44) Casimer is going to be singing at five. 
It would be interesting to know whether the higher PROG is in the same clause as 
the lower PROG, or in a different clause. If it is in the same clause, then "high 
aspect" is truly high in the clause, which is interesting; if it is in a different clause, 
it could be ordinary low aspect in a higher clause, which is less interesting. In this 
section we will investigate some evidence bearing on this question. One hypothesis 
is that bgt is monoclausal ;  the competing hypothesis is that it is biclausal , perhaps 
with the following structure: 
(45) Casimer [PROGPis [ vp(?) going [TP _ to [PRoGpbe singing]] ] ]  
The evidence against this structure is inconclusive, but suggestive. First we will 
look at some syntactic properties of bgt, and then at how these competing hypothe­
ses fare in light of Cinque ( 1999). 
6 . 1 .  Bgt is not control 
If bgt is biclausal , then a priori, the subject either raises out of the lower Spec, TP 
position, or controls a PRO in that position. But here we will see that control could 
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not be the right analysis, because bgt behaves like a raising verb instead of a control 
verb on a number of classic tests . 
For example, both bgt and raising predicates such as be likely to support 
idiomatic re�dings, while control predicates such as be willing to do not: 
(46) a. The cat is going to be out of the bag. 
b. The cat is likely to be out of the bag. 
c .  * The cat is willing to be out of the bag. 
Also, neither bgt nor raising predicates allow infinitival topicalization, unlike con­
trol predicates: 
(47) a. * To be the best candidate, Mary is going. 
b. * To be the best candidate, Mary is likely. 
c. To be the best candidate, Mary is willing. 
Finally, while control predicates permit a cleft of the infinitive, bgt and raising 
predicates do not. 
(48) a. * It is to be the best candidate that Mary is going. 
b. * It is to be the best candidate that Mary is likely. 
c. It is to be the best candidate that Mary is willing. 
So if we were to pursue a biclausal analysis of bgt, it would have to involve raising 
rather than control. Of course, these facts are also consistent with a monoclausal 
analysis . 
6.2. Going and to cannot be separated 
Bgt differs from other raising predicates in that to cannot be separated from the 
predicate (in the case of bgt, going). Neither parentheticals nor negation, for exam­
ple, can intervene, in contrast to other raising predicates :  
(49) a. * Mary is going, I believe, to be there. 
b. Mary is likely, I believe, to be there. 
(50) a. * Mary is going not to be there. 
b. Mary is likely not to be there. 
Right node raising is also out:9 
(5 1 )  
a. * Mary is going and (is) supposed to be there. 
b. Mary seems (to me) and appears (to John) to be there. 
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It's not clear what we ought to conclude from these facts, but at the very least, we 
seem not to be dealing with an ordinary infinitive. While at first blush it seems 
possible that the to cliticizes to going purely as a phonological process, and that the 
existence of the contracted form gonna is a reflection of the same process, the latter 
cannot be true. Want to also has a contracted form, as in (52b), but the examples in 
(53) show that the to is in fact separable from want. 
(52) a. I'm gonna go to Calabria. 
b. I wanna go to Calabria. 
(53) a. I want, strangely enough, to go to Calabria. 
b. I want not to go to Calabria. 
c .  I want and expect to go to Calabria. 
So we will have to proceed without an explanation of the inseparability of going 
and to. I find it plausible that the inseparability is telling us that what was once a 
biclausal structure has become a monoclausal one, but this is not the only possibil­
ity. However, we might note that there is reason to believe that the to in bgt is not 
behaving like an ordinary non-finite tense head. It is also important to recognize 
that going and to cannot be separated, so that we do not try to put adverbs between 
them and draw conclusions from the fact that they cannot appear there. 
6 .3 .  Cinque 
The project in Cinque (1999) is to determine a universal hierarchy of functional 
projections. Each functional projection can be detected two ways: by the seman­
tically appropriate adverbial in the specifier, or by the head. Below is a portion of 
his hierarchy. Right away we can see that there is a conflict between his hierarchy 
and the story we have been pursuing for bgt: there is no progressive higher than 
T future . Therefore a monoclausal analysis of bgt in the spirit of the preceding dis­
cussion will not be possible using Cinque's assumptions.  We will need to insert a 
high progressive head. 
(54) . . .  Moodevidential » Modepistemic » T past » T future » Moodirrealis » 
Modroot » ASPhabitual » Tanterior » ASPperfect » AsPretrospective » 
ASPdurative » ASPprogressive » AsPprospective » Voice . . .  
But is it possible to construct a reasonable biclausal analysis, retaining Cinque's 
assumptions? 
Suppose, as I have argued, that go is woll, i .e . ,  Cinque's T future , and there is 
no high progressive aspect. Then bgt actually has to be tri clausal, if we additionally 
make the entirely normal assumption that to in the lowest clause is in the ordinary 
. T slot, i .e .  Cinque's T past . The highest clause would have T past and ASPprogressive ' 
Then the middle clause would have Tfuture ; it couldn't be in the highest clause 
because for Cinque, ASPprogressive is lower, not higher, than T future . In the lowest 
clause would be to in T past . It could not be in the middle clause, because T future is 
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supposed to be lower, not higher, than T past . So if it is true, as I have argued, that 
go is wall, Cinque's assumptions lead us to a very implausible triclausal analysis . 
The higher progressive operator that I am arguing for, along with not analyzing to 
as the tense head, would allow us to have a monoclausal analysis instead. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper I have pursued the analysis of bgt given in ( 1 ) .  To support the idea that 
there is a real progressive operator in bgt, the methodology was to show similarities 
between bgt and progressives on the one hand, and the non-progressive versions, 
simple forms and will/would on the other. I presented similarities between bgt and 
will/would to support the idea that they share the same future modal wall. A formal 
treatment showed that wall must be at least an operator, and have some modality, 
though the exact nature of that modality was not forthcoming. Furthermore, it was 
argued, wall must be an eventive predicate. More data, on volunteering contexts , 
was presented, and the analysis was shown to handle it. 
In the last section I presented some evidence that bgt is really monoclausal , 
and therefore that the proposed progressive operator is really higher in the clause 
than usual. I would like to point out some of the implications of such a fact. 
Firstly, the existence of high aspect means that we need to extend Cinque's 
project to determine which aspects can be high, and how high they can be. 
Secondly, it has some implications for the question of whether Reichen­
bachian temporal points E ("event time"), R ("reference time") and S ("speech 
time") should be primitives in a theory of aspect. The Reichenbachian view (see 
Hornstein ( 1990» that E-R and R-S relations characterize all tense constructions 
was extended by Klein ( 1997) to include perfective and imperfective aspect as re­
flexes of the E-R relation. Each tense-aspect operator mediates between two of the 
Reichenbachian points, and the order of the points is determined structurally. 
One of the advantages of such a system is that it restricts the number of 
possible tense-aspect constructions . However, the existence of high aspect in com­
bination with low aspect (e.g . ,  (6» means that this view, which would exclude such 
a case, is too restrictive. Either we must invent more Reichenbachian primitives 
to account for all the temporal variables in such a sentence, or give up on the idea 
that they are primitives, as has been independently suggested by Stowell ( 1996). 
The evidence that there can be more than two tense-aspect elements in a sentence 
is complemented by evidence that there can be fewer than two, for which see, e.g. , 
Kratzer ( 1998), Dechaine ( 199 1 ), and En� ( 1 996). 
Thirdly, do low aspect and high aspect combine with phrases of the same 
type? I have been assuming that they do, but if, suppose, the (low) progressive 
is really an operator over events, does that commit us to the belief that wall P is 
a predicate of events? Even more problematically, ability modals in various lan­
guages show perfectivity contrasts (Bhatt, 2000); could an ability modal really take 
events as its arguments? Or times for that matter? One alternative would be to say 
that there are different imperfectives that have the same core semantics but operate 
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on different entities (see latridou (2000) for a similar proposal for tense) . Another 
solution might be to treat (im)perfectivity as operating over situations, as proposed 
in e.g. Cipria and Roberts (2001) .  
The analysis of bgt given here thus answers several questions, and raises 
a number of other interesting ones. While the latter are beyond the scope of this 
paper, I am going to return to them in future work. 
Endnotes 
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1 .  This kind of compositional analysis of bgt is not a foregone conclusion; 
Comrie ( 1976) and Cinque ( 1999) treat bgt as a "prospective aspect", and for Fleis­
chman ( 1983) it is a future tense with "speaker involvement." 
2. The mere fact that there is be -ing morphology in bgt does not automatically 
mean that there is a PROG operator; English -ing is not a)ways associated with 
progressive meaning, but also shows up in gerunds and absolutives .  
3 .  I will gloss over the fact that planning is not quite the right notion for futu-
rates, as can be seen from (i) :  
(i) The sun is rising tomorrow at 5am. 
4. It is not necessary that there be actual ambiguity here for the argument to go 
through, but I will assume that there is. 
5 .  Speakers may find ( 19b) acceptable on the assumption that Pedro has some 
control over whether he pitches a perfect game or not. Those speakers may find it 
easier to exclude the possibility that rain can be controlled or planned; (i) makes the 
same point as ( 19b) . Note also that (ii) is far more natural than (i) . 
(i) # It was going to rain yesterday, but then it didn't. 
(ii) It looked like it was going to rain yesterday, but then it didn't. 
6. One slightly different analysis of these facts (Noam Chomsky, p.c .) would 
be that bgt, instead of being ambiguous between a "futurate future" reading as in 
( 15c) and an "ongoing future" reading as in ( 15d) ,  is ambiguous between a straight 
futurate reading, as in ( 15a), and the ( 15d) ongoing future reading. However, the 
futurate reading of bgt does not always pattern with the futurate reading of regular 
progressives: 
(i) Pedro was always going to leave someday, but he never did. 
7 .  One interesting difference between will and simple forms in this regard is 
will sentences can be improved by embedding in some cases where simple forms 
cannot, as in the following examples: 
(i) I think it' ll rain. 
(ii) *1 think it rains .  
I have no explanation for this fact. 
8. If tenses are anaphora, this means that my "tense" is really a kind of aspect, 
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but that has been show to be true in at least some cases in English (Kratzer, 1998). 
9 .  Be supposed to shares with bgt the syntactic properties under discussion. 
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